The Mercy of God and the Death of the Innocent

Among the most difficult theological questions in Scripture is the apparent tension between the revealed character of YHWH and the repeated biblical accounts of divine judgment involving the destruction of entire populations, including children and others who bear no identifiable personal responsibility for the offenses being judged. Throughout Scripture, God is revealed as compassionate, merciful, patient, covenantally faithful, and committed to the restoration of his creation. Yet the same biblical canon contains accounts in which God not only permits catastrophic loss of life but is explicitly presented as its initiating agent. These narratives include the destruction of humanity in the flood (Gen 6–9), the annihilation of Sodom and Gomorrah (Gen 19), the death of Egypt’s firstborn (Exod 12), the destruction of households associated with Korah’s rebellion (Num 16), the conquest of Jericho (Josh 6), the command to destroy the Amalekites, including infants and nursing children (1 Sam 15:3), and the death of David’s infant son following the king’s transgression (2 Sam 12:15–18). Taken together, these accounts present something considerably more difficult than an isolated passage requiring historical clarification. They raise a sustained theological problem concerning the relationship between divine sovereignty, human innocence, covenant judgment, and the very nature of God.

The difficulty becomes especially pronounced when these narratives are read alongside YHWH’s self-revelation in Exodus 34:6–7. Following Israel’s rebellion with the golden calf, God reveals himself to Moses as רַחוּם וְחַנּוּן (raḥûm weḥannûn), compassionate and gracious; אֶרֶךְ אַפַּיִם (ʾerekh ʾappayim), slow to anger; and רַב־חֶסֶד וֶאֱמֶת (rav-ḥesed weʾemet), abounding in covenant loyalty and faithfulness. The language is not incidental. It becomes one of the most frequently recalled confessions of God’s character in Israel’s theological memory, appearing in various forms throughout Numbers 14:18, Nehemiah 9:17, Psalms 86:15 and 103:8, Joel 2:13, and Jonah 4:2. The Hebrew raḥûm, associated with the verbal root רחם (rḥm), carries the semantic field of compassion and deep tenderness, while ḥesed communicates enduring loyalty expressed through covenantal relationship. These qualities are not merely occasional divine behaviors; they belong to Israel’s foundational confession concerning who YHWH is.[1]

The same confession, however, includes the difficult declaration that God does not simply leave guilt unaddressed and that the consequences of ancestral iniquity may extend into subsequent generations. Exodus 34:7 employs the expression פֹּקֵד עֲוֹן אָבוֹת עַל־בָּנִים (poqed ʿawon ʾavot ʿal-banim), conventionally understood as visiting the iniquity of fathers upon children. The verb paqad can denote attending to, overseeing, reckoning with, or bringing an account into consideration. The text therefore holds divine mercy and intergenerational accountability together, but it does not explicitly explain why morally innocent children would be subjected to death because of the failures of their parents. Indeed, the problem intensifies when we encounter Deuteronomy 24:16, which expressly prohibits putting children to death for their fathers’ sins, and Ezekiel 18:20, which declares that a child shall not bear the iniquity of the parent. These texts cannot simply be dismissed as unrelated legal technicalities. They reveal that personal responsibility is itself a concern of covenant justice. While Deuteronomy addresses human judicial conduct and does not directly legislate divine action, it raises an unavoidable question: how are we to understand the moral consistency of the God who commands justice among his people when biblical narratives attribute to that same God the destruction of persons who appear innocent of the offenses being punished?

Numbers 16 illustrates this tension with particular clarity. When Moses confronts the rebellion of Korah, Dathan, and Abiram, the narrative places the wives, sons, and little children of Dathan and Abiram at the entrances of their tents (Num 16:27). The Hebrew טַפָּם (ṭappām) refers to their little ones or dependents, emphasizing individuals who cannot reasonably be assumed to share the informed culpability of the rebellious leaders. Shortly afterward, the earth opens and swallows the households. Moses himself had already raised the moral question when he and Aaron appealed to God: would the sin of one man provoke divine anger against the entire congregation (Num 16:22)? The narrative then describes a judgment that appears to reach beyond the guilty. Numbers 26:11 subsequently clarifies that Korah’s sons did not die, an important qualification to any overly comprehensive reading of the destruction, but it does not establish that the children of Dathan and Abiram survived. The theological question remains whether the death of innocent dependents can properly be identified as an expression of the compassionate character revealed in Exodus 34.[2]

This difficulty is not overcome by distinguishing the God of the Hebrew Scriptures from the God revealed in Jesus Christ. Such a distinction would be foreign to the theological claims of the New Testament. Jesus identifies himself with the mission and purposes of Israel’s God, while the apostolic writings present him as the definitive revelation of the Father. Hebrews 1:1–3 describes the Son as the exact representation of God’s being, and John 1:18 presents the Son as the one who makes the unseen Father known. Jesus’ declaration in John 14:9, that whoever has seen him has seen the Father, places considerable interpretive weight upon his life and ministry. His treatment of enemies, children, outsiders, sinners, and the religiously excluded must therefore inform Christian reflection upon divine character. Jesus welcomes little children, commands love for enemies, rebukes disciples who wish to summon destructive fire upon a Samaritan village, and prays for those responsible for his execution (Luke 9:51–56; 18:15–17; 23:34). Nevertheless, the New Testament also preserves stern warnings of judgment, including sayings attributed to Jesus himself. A Christological hermeneutic cannot resolve the difficulty merely by identifying violence with the Old Testament and mercy with the New. The theological task is to understand how judgment and mercy coexist within the revelation of the one God whose character is made known in Christ.

This has long been, in my personal estimation, the most difficult theological problem to reconcile in the biblical canon. The problem is not primarily the existence of divine judgment. A God who never confronted evil, oppression, or covenant unfaithfulness could hardly be described as just. Rather, the difficulty concerns the destruction of those who are not themselves morally accountable for the rebellion being judged. A newborn Egyptian firstborn cannot meaningfully be assigned Pharaoh’s culpability. An Amalekite nursing infant cannot be treated as an informed participant in generations of hostility against Israel. David’s child cannot reasonably be held responsible for the king’s adultery and orchestration of Uriah’s death. The seriousness of human sin does not settle the question of the innocence of those who suffer because of it. Nor does a future benefit automatically establish the moral legitimacy of an earlier harm.

One may affirm that Scripture is coherent in its ultimate theological witness without claiming that every text is immediately reconcilable at the level of surface description. The challenge, then, is not to announce a contradiction within Scripture and abandon the question, nor to force the texts into agreement through assertions that leave their moral implications unexplored. It is to investigate whether the biblical canon itself provides categories for understanding divine judgment within a larger redemptive horizon. Traditional Christian theology has offered several important explanations, many of which preserve genuine biblical truths. Three approaches in particular deserve careful consideration. Yet, in my estimation, each leaves an unresolved difficulty and can require considerable theological maneuvering to reconcile the destruction of innocent people with God’s confessed compassion. I wish to explore another possibility, rooted in ancient Jewish understandings of death, the intermediate state, Christ’s proclamation to the dead, and the possibility that divine judgment, even when involving physical death, does not necessarily represent God’s final disposition toward those who perish.

The first traditional explanation appeals to the absolute sovereignty of God as creator and sustainer of life. Since life originates in God and remains dependent upon his sustaining will, God possesses authority over its beginning and termination in a manner that human beings do not. Deuteronomy 32:39 declares that YHWH kills and makes alive, wounds and heals, while 1 Samuel 2:6 similarly attributes both death and life to divine agency. Job’s confession that YHWH gives and takes away is frequently invoked to emphasize creaturely dependence upon divine providence. Within classical Christian theology, this account has often been developed through the distinction between divine authority over life and the moral limitations imposed upon human creatures. Human beings may not take innocent life because they do not possess unrestricted sovereignty over another person’s existence. God, however, as the giver of life, is understood to possess an authority that transcends ordinary human jurisdiction.[3]

There is considerable theological force in this argument. Any serious doctrine of creation must acknowledge that humanity does not exist autonomously and that divine authority cannot simply be reduced to human categories of legal ownership or moral jurisdiction. Yet sovereignty, by itself, establishes authority rather than demonstrating the goodness of a particular exercise of authority. The question is not whether God has the power to terminate physical life but why terminating the life of an innocent child would constitute an expression of divine justice or compassion. To argue that an action is morally good solely because God performs it risks making divine goodness indistinguishable from unrestricted power. Scripture, however, repeatedly invites reflection upon God’s actions according to recognizably moral categories. Abraham’s question in Genesis 18:25—whether the Judge of all the earth will do justice—presupposes that divine judgment is meaningfully connected to justice rather than exempt from its evaluation. Moses’ intercession in Numbers 16:22 similarly appeals to the apparent injustice of indiscriminate destruction.

A more developed doctrine of sovereignty therefore needs to distinguish between God’s rightful authority over human life, his moral purposes in the exercise of that authority, and the particular means through which his judgment is accomplished. Without these distinctions, the argument effectively becomes that God is necessarily just even where the reasons for his action remain inaccessible. Such an appeal may be consistent with certain understandings of providence, but it does not fully reconcile the moral tension. It relocates the tension into an assertion of unknowable divine prerogative. Moreover, the God revealed in Exodus 34 is not described merely as sovereign but as compassionate, patient, and faithful. A sufficient theological account must explain how sovereignty is exercised in accordance with those attributes rather than treating sovereignty as an answer that renders further moral inquiry unnecessary.

The second traditional explanation appeals to the corporate character of ancient Israelite society and the broader ancient Near Eastern understanding of household, kinship, and covenant identity. In this worldview, moral action was rarely conceived as affecting only the isolated individual. The Hebrew בַּיִת (bayit), meaning house or household, could encompass children, extended relatives, servants, possessions, and successive generations. The behavior of a household’s representative could affect the social, economic, political, and religious welfare of the entire group. Biblical narratives frequently operate within this corporate framework, particularly where rebellion threatens covenant identity or communal holiness. The account of Achan in Joshua 7, the destruction of the households in Numbers 16, and the judgment upon Egypt’s firstborn all reflect, in different ways, the collective dimensions of ancient covenant life. Such accounts should not be interpreted as though they were written within the individualistic moral assumptions of modern Western society.[4]

Corporate solidarity, however, describes the social framework within which the narratives operate; it does not independently demonstrate the moral legitimacy of every consequence experienced by members of the group. There is a meaningful distinction between recognizing that children suffer because of their parents’ decisions and affirming that those children deserve punishment for decisions they did not make. Indeed, the Torah itself complicates a simplistic corporate model. Deuteronomy 24:16 rejects substituting one generation for another in judicial execution, while Ezekiel 18 challenges the assumption that ancestral wrongdoing establishes the guilt of descendants. Jeremiah 31:29–30 similarly anticipates an understanding of responsibility in which individuals answer for their own wrongdoing. These texts need not eliminate every form of corporate consequence to establish the important principle that inherited consequences and inherited moral culpability are not synonymous.

The problem is particularly apparent where the narrative depicts God as directly initiating destruction rather than merely allowing a community to experience the foreseeable consequences of collective decisions. Children may suffer famine because of a king’s policies, but the moral question becomes more difficult when the text portrays God as intentionally destroying those children as part of judgment upon the king. The claim that the household constituted a single covenantal unit helps us understand why an ancient narrator might describe the event corporately. It does not explain why the God who prohibits the judicial execution of children for parental wrongdoing would enact a judgment involving their deaths. Corporate solidarity remains an indispensable historical consideration, but it cannot function as a complete theological reconciliation.

A third approach locates the difficulty in the historical and literary character of biblical revelation. Ancient Near Eastern literature often attributed political, military, and natural events to divine agency, interpreting national victories and catastrophes through the theological assumptions of the communities preserving those traditions. Accounts of conquest could also employ sweeping destruction formulas, describing the elimination of entire populations in language that did not always correspond to literal demographic annihilation. Biblical texts participate in this literary environment while also revising its theological assumptions. The apparent tension between Joshua’s descriptions of comprehensive conquest and Judges’ accounts of surviving Canaanite populations illustrates why ancient victory rhetoric requires careful examination. Likewise, Numbers 16 displays literary complexities concerning the interwoven accounts of Korah and the Reubenite rebels, while Numbers 26:11 explicitly preserves the survival of Korah’s sons.[5]

This approach becomes more theologically significant when combined with progressive revelation. It proposes that divine revelation was received, narrated, and interpreted within the developing historical understanding of Israel, culminating in the revelation of God through Jesus Christ. The differing attributions of David’s census in 2 Samuel 24:1 and 1 Chronicles 21:1 provide a particularly interesting example: the former attributes the incitement to YHWH, while the latter attributes it to Satan. This difference does not necessarily establish that the earlier author was mistaken, since traditions of primary and secondary causation provide another plausible explanation. Nevertheless, it demonstrates that biblical texts may describe divine agency through differing theological perspectives. A Christocentric approach can therefore distinguish the inspired theological significance of a narrative from the assumption that every ancient description of divine causality constitutes an exhaustive explanation of God’s involvement.

The limitation is that this solution becomes increasingly difficult when applied universally to the biblical accounts of destructive judgment. We are not dealing with a single disputed metaphor or one ambiguous historical tradition. Across multiple literary genres and historical settings, Scripture repeatedly and explicitly associates YHWH with catastrophic destruction. To claim that these attributions consistently reflect inadequate ancient understandings of God places a considerable burden upon the doctrine of inspiration and upon the reliability of the narratives themselves. Literary conventions can help explain the language of total destruction but cannot be used indiscriminately to deny the deaths of children who are explicitly included within the accounts. Nor can progressive revelation become a convenient mechanism for rejecting every earlier text that challenges a preferred theological formulation. Although this model has substantial interpretive value, I remain unconvinced that it adequately resolves the cumulative moral problem. It may explain how the texts were written without fully addressing what their testimony implies about divine character.

An alternative approach begins not by diminishing divine agency in the judgment narratives but by questioning whether physical death represents the termination of God’s redemptive dealings with those who die. Much traditional discussion assumes that the destruction of a person within a biblical judgment constitutes that individual’s final encounter with divine justice, or at least fixes irreversibly the person’s eternal condition. Yet this assumption deserves examination. The Hebrew Scriptures, Second Temple Jewish literature, and early Christian writings preserve an extensive range of traditions concerning the realm of the dead, the intermediate condition of departed persons, future resurrection, judgment beyond physical death, and the possibility of divine activity among those who have already died. Although these traditions do not establish a uniform doctrine of postmortem repentance, they provide a conceptual framework in which death and final judgment need not be understood as identical events.

The importance of this distinction becomes apparent when we return to the innocent victims of divine judgment. If physical death ends the possibility of any further encounter with divine grace, then the death of an innocent child appears not only tragic but potentially an irreversible exclusion from the fulfillment of that child’s created purpose. If, however, the dead remain within God’s redemptive horizon and await a resurrection in which justice, restoration, and reconciliation may yet be realized, the theological implications change considerably. A child killed during the destruction of Jericho or in the judgment upon Egypt would not necessarily have been rejected by God, even if the narrative attributes the catastrophe to divine judgment. This does not establish that the child’s death was morally necessary or justified. It does, however, challenge the assumption that temporal destruction and eternal condemnation must be understood as inseparable.

Such a proposal must avoid confusing three distinct claims. The first is that the dead exist in an intermediate condition before final resurrection and judgment. The second is that God may act redemptively toward persons in that condition, including through proclamation, revelation, or purification. The third is that all persons will eventually respond positively and experience complete reconciliation. The first has substantial support within Jewish and Christian eschatological traditions. The second is more contested but possesses important textual and historical witnesses. The third constitutes the much larger claim associated with universal reconciliation and remains a disputed question within Christian theology. My proposal does not depend initially upon affirming all three. It begins by asking whether the first two provide a more adequate framework for approaching the deaths of those who appear innocent within the biblical judgment narratives.

The principal Hebrew designation for the realm of the dead is שְׁאוֹל (šĕʾôl), usually transliterated Sheol. Within the Hebrew Scriptures, Sheol is not consistently presented as the equivalent of later Christian conceptions of hell. It is the domain associated with the dead, the grave, darkness, silence, and separation from ordinary participation in earthly life. Jacob anticipates descending to Sheol in grief over Joseph (Gen 37:35), while Job describes Sheol as a place to which human beings descend irrespective of their earthly prosperity or suffering (Job 3:11–19; 7:9). Psalm 88 presents the realm of the dead as a place of profound darkness and abandonment, whereas Psalm 139:8 strikingly declares that even Sheol lies within the reach of God’s presence. These portrayals do not amount to a developed doctrine of the afterlife, but they resist the assumption that physical death necessarily constitutes a final judicial verdict concerning eternal destiny.[6]

The ancient Israelite conception of the person is also important. The Hebrew נֶפֶשׁ (nepeš) generally denotes a living being, life, or the person understood as a whole, rather than functioning consistently as the Greek philosophical concept of an independently immortal soul. Likewise, רוּחַ (rûaḥ) can refer to breath, wind, spirit, or the life-giving activity associated with God. Biblical anthropology is therefore not adequately summarized through a rigid separation between an immortal soul and a disposable material body. Resurrection, especially as it develops in later biblical literature, concerns the vindication and restoration of embodied human existence. Daniel 12:2 is particularly significant because it anticipates the awakening of those who sleep in the dust, some to everlasting life and others to shame and contempt. Isaiah 26:19 similarly expresses the hope that the dead shall live and rise. These passages establish that death does not necessarily exhaust the possibility of future divine judgment or restoration.

The idea of an intermediate condition becomes more developed in Second Temple Jewish literature. First Enoch 22 presents a visionary account of the souls of the dead gathered within distinct compartments while awaiting an appointed day of judgment. The angel Raphael explains that these places have been prepared to receive the dead until the great judgment. Particularly notable is the portrayal of Abel, whose spirit continues to appeal for justice after his murder. Here the dead are not simply absent from divine concern. Their condition remains connected to unresolved justice, and their final disposition lies in the future. However, this passage should not be overstated. First Enoch 22 does not clearly teach universal postmortem repentance; indeed, its different compartments include severe expectations for the wicked. Its significance for the present argument is more limited but still substantial: death and final judgment are differentiated, and the dead await an eschatological resolution beyond their earthly circumstances.[7]

A related but somewhat different picture appears in 4 Ezra 7:75–101, a Jewish apocalypse written in the aftermath of the destruction of Jerusalem. The text describes the experiences of departed spirits before the final renewal of creation, distinguishing the condition of the righteous from that of the wicked. The dead are conscious of their moral history and of the judgment that awaits them. Yet this witness also exposes a significant obstacle to any easy doctrine of a second opportunity, since 4 Ezra 7:82 expressly describes the wicked as unable to repent in order to obtain life after death. This evidence is important because Second Temple Judaism was not theologically uniform. Some Jewish traditions imagined an intermediate realm in which the dead awaited judgment, while others strongly emphasized the irreversible consequences of earthly decisions. An appeal to Jewish eschatology must therefore acknowledge diversity rather than treating the entire period as though it possessed a single, established doctrine of postmortem conversion.[8]

The parable of the rich man and Lazarus in Luke 16:19–31 reflects this larger world of Jewish eschatological imagination. The dead are depicted as conscious, differentiated in their circumstances, and awaiting a larger eschatological fulfillment. Lazarus rests in Abraham’s bosom, while the rich man experiences anguish in Hades. The Greek ᾅδης (hadēs), regularly used in the Septuagint for Hebrew Sheol, designates the realm of the dead and does not necessarily carry every later theological association attached to the English term hell. The narrative also describes a great chasm separating the two conditions, a detail that must be taken seriously by any proposal concerning postmortem repentance. Whether this parable should be interpreted as a literal geography of the intermediate state remains disputed; its primary rhetorical concern is the reversal of earthly status and the responsibility to heed Moses and the prophets. Nevertheless, it confirms that Jesus could employ a recognizable Jewish conceptual framework in which death did not immediately eliminate consciousness, moral differentiation, or expectation.

The Christian confession that Jesus descended to the dead introduces a potentially decisive development. Within early Christian theology, the death and resurrection of Jesus were not merely events occurring among the living but constituted a victory extending into the realm of death itself. The Apostles’ Creed eventually articulated this conviction through the confession that Christ descended to the dead, traditionally expressed in Latin as descendit ad inferos. This formulation should not automatically be equated with the claim that Jesus entered the place of final condemnation or suffered additional punishment there. Rather, in important strands of historic Christian interpretation, the descent signifies that Christ truly entered the condition of the departed and that his redemptive victory extends beyond the boundaries of earthly life. The precise nature of that descent, its beneficiaries, and the content of Christ’s activity there have been debated throughout Christian history.[9]

First Peter 3:18–20 is central to the discussion. Following the statement that Christ suffered for sins, the righteous for the unrighteous, the author declares that Christ was put to death in the flesh but made alive in the spirit, ἐν ᾧ καὶ τοῖς ἐν φυλακῇ πνεύμασιν πορευθεὶς ἐκήρυξεν (en hō kai tois en phylakē pneumasin poreutheis ekēryxen), commonly rendered as a proclamation made to the spirits in prison. The verb κηρύσσω (kēryssō) means to proclaim or herald and does not by itself establish that the message offered repentance or salvation. The reference to the days of Noah is especially intriguing because it connects Christ’s proclamation to one of the most devastating accounts of corporate destruction in the Hebrew Scriptures. If the imprisoned spirits are interpreted as deceased human beings from the flood generation, the text would appear to demonstrate that those who experienced catastrophic judgment were not thereby beyond the reach of Christ’s proclamation.

There are, however, substantial interpretive disagreements. Some understand the spirits as the rebellious heavenly beings associated with Genesis 6 and the Watchers traditions preserved in First Enoch 6–15. In this interpretation, Christ announces his victory over imprisoned cosmic powers rather than extending salvation to deceased human beings. Others understand Christ to have preached through Noah to people who were alive before the flood but are now described as imprisoned spirits. A third interpretation, prominent in portions of early Christian tradition, understands the passage as Christ’s proclamation to the human dead during his descent. These possibilities cannot be collapsed into a single uncontroversial reading. The Enochic context provides strong support for the angelic interpretation, while the broader history of interpretation demonstrates that a proclamation to the human dead was an early and influential Christian understanding.[10]

First Peter 4:6 presents an equally important and perhaps more promising passage: εἰς τοῦτο γὰρ καὶ νεκροῖς εὐηγγελίσθη (eis touto gar kai nekrois euēngelisthē), commonly translated, “For this reason the gospel was preached even to the dead.” Unlike the verb employed in 3:19, εὐαγγελίζομαι (euangelizomai) explicitly denotes the proclamation of good news. The passage continues by describing a purpose in which people, though judged according to human standards in the flesh, might live according to God in the spirit. The central disagreement concerns whether the recipients were already dead when the gospel was proclaimed or whether they heard the gospel during earthly life and subsequently died. David Horrell has argued that the former interpretation remains more defensible than many modern commentators acknowledge. If so, the passage provides meaningful textual grounds for investigating the possibility that the redemptive proclamation of Christ reaches beyond physical death.[11]

The importance of this possibility should not be minimized, particularly when considering the flood narrative. If those who died during Noah’s generation remained subjects of divine concern and encountered the proclamation of Christ, then their physical destruction did not necessarily constitute God’s final word concerning them. A judgment that terminated their historical existence could still be followed by an opportunity to encounter divine truth. Such an interpretation would not establish that all responded favorably, nor would it demonstrate that the deaths themselves were morally justified. Nevertheless, it would significantly modify the assumption that divine destruction and eternal exclusion must coincide. The God revealed as compassionate in Exodus 34 might continue to extend mercy even beyond the temporal judgments attributed to him within Israel’s historical narratives.

Jesus’ exchange with the repentant criminal in Luke 23:39–43 provides another important dimension. As one of the crucified men appeals to Jesus to remember him when he comes into his kingdom, Jesus responds that the man will be with him in paradise. The Greek παράδεισος (paradeisos) derives from an older Iranian term associated with an enclosed garden or park and appears in the Greek Scriptures in connection with garden imagery, particularly Eden. Within Jewish and early Christian eschatological discourse, paradise could designate a place or condition of blessedness associated with the righteous dead and the anticipated renewal of creation. Jesus’ promise therefore suggests fellowship with him beyond the immediate event of physical death, even though the thief will not live to participate in the earthly ministry of the emerging church.

This passage is commonly joined with the traditions of Abraham’s bosom and Christ’s descent to suggest that the righteous dead awaited the fulfillment of redemption within a blessed intermediate condition. Such an association is theologically plausible, though the relevant texts do not explicitly identify paradise and Abraham’s bosom as identical locations. Nor does Luke 23 independently demonstrate that the thief descended with Jesus into precisely the same realm described in 1 Peter 3. The account primarily establishes that the thief’s death does not prevent his participation in the saving presence of Jesus. The familiar debate concerning the placement of the comma in Jesus’ statement also deserves mention, since the earliest Greek manuscripts did not contain modern punctuation. The conventional reading attaches “today” to Jesus’ promise of companionship, and this remains the most natural reading in the immediate Lukan context, although alternative punctuation has been proposed.

The broader theological implication concerns the ability of Christ’s presence to transcend physical death. If the thief can enter into communion with Christ beyond the grave, and if Christ’s descent involves the proclamation of divine victory or good news among the dead, then the intermediate state may need to be understood not merely as passive waiting but as a domain reached by the Messiah’s redemptive accomplishment. This is compatible with the historic Christian confession of Christ’s descent, but a crucial distinction must be retained: the descent of Christ to liberate the righteous dead is a historically orthodox Christian teaching; the assertion that all deceased persons receive a new opportunity for repentance is a further, disputed theological proposal. The Roman Catholic Catechism, for example, explicitly affirms Christ’s descent to the realm of the dead while distinguishing his liberation of the righteous from the deliverance of the damned. It therefore supports the larger doctrine of Christ’s activity among the dead without endorsing an unrestricted postmortem offer of salvation.[12]

This distinction is essential for the argument. It would be historically inaccurate to describe universal postmortem conversion as the established orthodox doctrine of the early church. Yet it would be equally inaccurate to suggest that Christian tradition uniformly imagined death as a boundary beyond which Christ exercised no further redemptive activity. The descent tradition stands as an important witness that the victory of Jesus extends into the realm of those who died before his historical ministry. The question is whether this reality should be understood as an exceptional event associated with the transition between the covenants or as the disclosure of something enduring about the redemptive character of God.

A further dimension emerges from Jewish practices associated with the remembrance of the dead and the expectation of resurrection. The clearest pre-Christian Jewish textual witness to prayer on behalf of the dead appears in 2 Maccabees 12:38–46. Following a battle in which Jewish soldiers were killed, Judas Maccabeus and his companions discovered forbidden objects associated with idolatry among the possessions of the fallen. The community prayed that the offense might be forgiven, and Judas collected funds to provide an offering at Jerusalem. The narrator explicitly connects this action to the expectation of resurrection, arguing that prayer for the dead would be meaningless if the fallen were not expected to rise again. This is a remarkable witness to the conviction that the moral and eschatological condition of the deceased remained within the concern of the living covenant community.[13]

The historical setting needs to be understood accurately. The passage describes a collection for a purification offering in Jerusalem, not the construction of individual altars over the graves of the dead. Although burial sites, memorial practices, and care for ancestors were known throughout the ancient Near East, the Hebrew Bible does not establish a normative system of erecting altars to pray deceased Israelites into reconciliation. Indeed, the Torah sharply restricts ritual engagement with the dead, particularly where necromancy and the consultation of departed spirits are concerned (Deut 18:10–12). The intercession described in 2 Maccabees belongs to a different category from the forbidden attempt to obtain information or power from the dead. Its theological concern is that those who have died remain persons for whom forgiveness and future resurrection are meaningful realities.

The canonical status of 2 Maccabees differs among Christian traditions. It is received as Scripture in Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox contexts, while most Protestant traditions classify it among the Apocrypha rather than the canonical books of the Old Testament. Regardless of one’s canonical commitments, the account provides important evidence for the theological imagination of Second Temple Judaism. It also became significant for later Christian discussions of prayer for the dead, purification, and the intermediate state. The Catholic doctrine of purgatory should not simply be identified with universal reconciliation or an unrestricted second chance after death. Within Catholic theology, purgatory concerns the purification of those already destined for salvation, not a general postmortem conversion of the finally unrepentant. Nevertheless, the practice of praying for the dead reflects the broader conviction that the departed are not beyond God’s concern and that the living community continues to participate in hope for their eschatological well-being.

The language of reconciliation provides an important theological framework for interpreting such practices. If persons who died in sin may still be objects of prayer, and if the efficacy of those prayers is associated with future resurrection, then the community’s relationship to the dead is not defined exclusively by the finality of earthly circumstances. They remain brothers, sisters, ancestors, and members of a history that God has not yet fully brought to completion. This does not establish that every deceased person can repent after death, but it demonstrates that portions of Jewish and Christian tradition have refused to regard the boundary of physical death as the termination of every meaningful relationship between the departed and God’s redemptive purposes.

Any account of postmortem restoration must also consider whether divine judgment is fundamentally retributive, corrective, restorative, or some combination of these. The Hebrew Scriptures employ a variety of metaphors for judgment, including fire, refining, cleansing, and purification. Malachi 3:2–3 describes YHWH as a refiner’s fire and fullers’ soap, purifying the descendants of Levi so that their offerings may once again be acceptable. Isaiah 1:25 similarly depicts divine action as the removal of dross, while Isaiah 4:4 associates cleansing with a spirit of judgment and burning. These passages reveal an important biblical pattern: the purpose of divine judgment may be the removal of impurity rather than the annihilation of the person or community undergoing purification. Judgment, in such contexts, serves covenant restoration.

This restorative dimension is also reflected in texts concerning the nations. Isaiah 19:22 declares that YHWH will strike Egypt, striking and healing, and that the Egyptians will return to YHWH, who will respond to their pleas and heal them. The Hebrew pairing of נָגַף (nāgap, to strike) and רָפָא (rāpāʾ, to heal) is theologically arresting. Egypt, the nation associated with Israel’s oppression and the death of the firstborn, is nevertheless imagined as a people capable of returning to YHWH and receiving divine healing. Isaiah 19:23–25 extends the vision further, presenting Egypt and Assyria alongside Israel within an extraordinary oracle of blessing. Such passages make it difficult to regard national judgment as necessarily synonymous with irrevocable national rejection. The prophetic imagination is capable of envisioning the restoration of peoples previously subjected to divine destruction or condemnation.

Hosea 11:8–9 likewise portrays YHWH’s compassion in striking tension with impending judgment. God’s heart recoils at the prospect of delivering Ephraim to destruction, and the declaration that God is divine rather than human becomes the reason for restraint rather than a justification for unlimited wrath. Lamentations 3:31–33 similarly declares that the Lord will not reject forever and that affliction does not arise willingly from his heart. The Hebrew expression מִלִּבּוֹ (millibbô), literally “from his heart,” is particularly significant. The passage acknowledges divine affliction while distinguishing it from God’s fundamental disposition toward his people. Although these texts concern particular covenant communities and should not automatically be universalized to every human being, they establish a genuine prophetic pattern in which judgment is situated within a larger movement toward compassion, healing, and restoration.

The New Testament expands this imagery through its account of judgment by fire. First Corinthians 3:13–15 describes the testing of human works, some of which are consumed while the person is saved through fire. Paul is addressing the work of Christian builders and ministers, so the passage should not be treated as a direct exposition of universal postmortem purification. Nevertheless, it demonstrates that destructive fire and personal salvation are not necessarily mutually exclusive theological categories. Hebrews 12:5–11 likewise portrays divine discipline as ordered toward holiness, though its immediate concern is God’s formation of his children during their earthly lives. These passages provide conceptual resources for distinguishing the destruction of what is evil from the ultimate destruction of those in whom evil has taken root.

A significant historical development of this understanding appears in the theology of Gregory of Nyssa. In his reflections on the soul, resurrection, freedom, and the final restoration of creation, Gregory develops a conception of purification in which evil is removed so that the created person may be restored toward the goodness for which humanity was intended. His thought participates in a larger early Christian discussion concerning ἀποκατάστασις (apokatastasis), or restoration, associated also with Origen and later theological debates. The precise relationship between Gregory’s thought and modern universalism requires careful qualification, but his work demonstrates that the relationship between judgment, purification, and ultimate restoration was a serious concern within patristic theology rather than merely a modern attempt to soften difficult biblical texts.[14]

The moral implications for the present discussion are significant. If judgment is understood as restorative rather than exclusively retaliatory, then those who die under divine judgment may not necessarily be understood as permanently excluded from the possibility of communion with God. Yet an essential distinction must again be maintained concerning innocent children. A child killed as part of a corporate judgment does not require purification from the guilt of a rebellion in which the child did not participate. Any account of restoration must therefore recognize the difference between the correction of genuine moral evil and the healing of innocent persons who suffered through the actions of others. The former may involve repentance and refinement; the latter requires vindication, resurrection, and the restoration of a life prematurely interrupted. A theology that subjects innocent children to punitive purification for ancestral offenses would merely recreate the original moral problem in the afterlife.

The possibility that God’s redemptive activity continues beyond physical death naturally leads to the larger question of universal reconciliation. Within Christian theology, this view is often called universal reconciliation, Christian universalism, or, in certain historical contexts, apokatastasis. Although these expressions are not always interchangeable, they share an interest in whether God’s ultimate victory over evil includes the eventual restoration of every human person. This differs from the narrower claim that Christ proclaimed good news to some of the pre-Christian dead. Universal reconciliation proposes that divine judgment, however severe, does not finally defeat God’s restorative purposes and that the consummation of redemption results in the reconciliation of all persons to God.

Several Pauline passages provide significant material for this discussion. Romans 5:18–19 establishes a sweeping correspondence between Adam’s trespass and Christ’s righteous act. The Greek expression εἰς πάντας ἀνθρώπους (eis pantas anthrōpous), “to all human beings,” appears within Paul’s contrast between condemnation through Adam and justification leading to life through Christ. Universalist interpreters emphasize the parallel scope of these statements, arguing that the redemptive work of Christ is presented as no less comprehensive than the consequences of Adam’s transgression. Other interpreters maintain that the universal language describes the extent or availability of Christ’s saving accomplishment without necessarily asserting the salvation of every individual. The interpretive question concerns whether Paul’s parallelism implies an identical final population on both sides or whether the broader argument introduces distinctions concerning those who receive the gift of grace.

First Corinthians 15:22–28 offers a related but distinct argument. Paul declares that as all die in Adam, so all will be made alive in Christ, before describing the defeat of every opposing rule and authority and the destruction of death itself. The eschatological culmination occurs when the Son subjects all things to the Father so that God may be πάντα ἐν πᾶσιν (panta en pasin), “all in all.” The Greek vocabulary is expansive, although interpreters debate whether being made alive in Christ refers to universal resurrection or universal salvific participation. It is also necessary to distinguish the subjection of hostile powers from their reconciliation. Yet the passage unquestionably places the destruction of death within the larger accomplishment of Christ’s reign. Death is not presented as God’s final victory over humanity but as the last enemy overcome by the Messiah.

Colossians 1:19–20 may provide an even more direct theological statement concerning the scope of reconciliation. The text declares God’s purpose to reconcile τὰ πάντα (ta panta), “all things,” through Christ, making peace through the blood of his cross, whether things on earth or things in heaven. The verb ἀποκαταλλάσσω (apokatallassō) denotes reconciliation, and the cosmic scope of Paul’s language has generated considerable discussion regarding whether the final renewal encompasses the restoration of every rational creature or the comprehensive ordering of creation under Christ’s victorious lordship. Philippians 2:9–11 likewise anticipates every knee bowing and every tongue confessing the lordship of Jesus Christ, echoing Isaiah 45:23. The confession may be understood as willing worship or as universal acknowledgment of divine sovereignty, depending upon the interpreter’s broader theological commitments. Acts 3:21 adds the expression χρόνων ἀποκαταστάσεως πάντων (chronōn apokatastaseōs pantōn), referring to the times of restoration of all things spoken through the prophets. In context, this concerns the promised restoration of God’s purposes; whether it includes the eventual salvation of every individual is debated.

The universalist reading must also account for passages that appear to establish the possibility of definitive exclusion or destruction. Matthew 25:46 contrasts eternal punishment with eternal life, employing αἰώνιος (aiōnios) in both expressions. The word is related to αἰών (aiōn), meaning an age, but its contextual usage can express enduring or everlasting duration. It is therefore linguistically inadequate simply to assert that aiōnios always means temporary or age-limited. Second Thessalonians 1:9 speaks of everlasting destruction, while Revelation 20:11–15 portrays a final judgment involving the lake of fire and the second death. Hebrews 9:27 describes death followed by judgment, a sequence that provides little direct support for an unrestricted series of postmortem opportunities. These texts constitute substantial challenges to universal reconciliation and cannot be dismissed merely by appealing to divine love.

The most important issue for this proposal is therefore not simply whether Jesus descended to the dead, but whether the redemptive significance of that descent extends beyond those who died before his historical incarnation. Within traditional Christian interpretation, the descent is frequently understood as the liberation of the righteous who awaited the fulfillment of God’s promises. This raises an important historical distinction. Those who lived before the death and resurrection of Christ could not have responded to the gospel in precisely the same historical circumstances as those who encountered its proclamation afterward. The descent tradition thus provides a theological account of how Christ’s saving accomplishment reaches backward into human history. But does the same redemptive logic reach forward to those who die after the resurrection without having adequately encountered, understood, or responded to the Christ and His gospel?

The question is sharpened by the universal scope of Christ’s work. If his death and resurrection constitute the decisive defeat of sin, death, and the hostile powers, it is reasonable to ask whether the boundaries of physical existence restrict the reach of that victory. Romans 8:38–39 insists that neither death nor life can separate believers from the love of God in Christ Jesus, although the immediate promise concerns those already participating in that relationship. Revelation 1:18 presents the risen Jesus as possessing the keys of Death and Hades. The imagery communicates authority over the realm that previously held humanity captive. Yet authority over death does not, by itself, establish that every person within that realm will eventually experience reconciliation.

One theological possibility is that the descent of Christ discloses something enduring about God’s relationship to the dead: that judgment is not necessarily the cessation of divine address, and that the revelation of Christ may reach persons whose earthly lives ended before they possessed a meaningful opportunity to respond. Such a possibility is especially relevant to the innocent victims of biblical catastrophe, including infants and young children whose developmental condition renders the categories of conscious rebellion, repentance, and informed covenant allegiance inapplicable. In their case, the central issue is not necessarily a second opportunity for repentance but the fulfillment of a created destiny that earthly death prevented them from experiencing. Any coherent account must preserve the distinction between those who knowingly resist the good and those whose lives end before such a response is possible.

A further question concerns the scope of divine knowledge and human freedom. If God desires all people to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth, as 1 Timothy 2:4 declares, does the divine provision of saving grace necessarily cease at the moment of physical death? Conversely, if Scripture warns that judgment follows death, what grounds exist for asserting that opportunities for repentance remain available afterward? Neither question can be answered merely through an appeal to sovereignty. A robust theological account must explain how God’s desire for reconciliation, the reality of human response, the seriousness of evil, and the finality of eschatological judgment belong together. The possibility of postmortem proclamation should not be employed to diminish the urgency of discipleship, repentance, reconciliation, or participation in the kingdom of God during earthly life.

This brings the discussion back to the destruction of the innocent. Suppose the narratives of the flood, the Egyptian firstborn, Jericho, Amalek, and Numbers 16 describe genuine historical acts of divine judgment. Suppose also that those who perished were not universally or individually guilty of the offenses that precipitated the judgments. If the dead remain within the possibility of divine restoration, then physical destruction and final condemnation need not be identified. Those who died might yet encounter the righteous judgment and reconciling presence of Christ. For morally guilty persons, this could involve exposure, repentance, and transformation. For innocent victims, it would involve vindication, healing, and resurrection. Yet the possibility of such an outcome does not demonstrate that the initial deaths were necessary, proportionate, or morally justified. Any eventual reconciliation would need to address the original harm rather than merely render it insignificant.

The emerging theological proposal, then, is neither a denial of the biblical judgments nor an unqualified endorsement of universalism. It is an investigation into whether the biblical distinction between death and final judgment, the Second Temple expectation of an intermediate state, the Christian confession of Christ’s descent, and the possibility of eschatological restoration provide a more coherent framework for understanding divine violence. The central question remains whether temporal judgment can be distinguished from ultimate divine intention without weakening the moral force of the suffering described in the narratives. If God’s ultimate purpose is reconciliation, how does that purpose govern our understanding of judgments that appear to destroy the innocent? And if Christ’s victory reaches into the realm of the dead, what theological grounds exist for limiting that victory to those who died before his resurrection?

These are questions that require further examination before a conclusion concerning divine violence and ultimate reconciliation can responsibly be drawn.

Perhaps the greatest challenge in wrestling with these passages is not whether we can develop a theological framework capable of explaining every difficult act attributed to God, but whether we can emerge from that examination with greater confidence in the character of the One we worship. I have spent much of my life studying Scripture, teaching theology, and seeking to understand the nature of God through the Hebrew Scriptures, the world of Second Temple Judaism, and the revelation of Jesus Christ. Yet few questions have challenged me more deeply than the apparent destruction of innocent lives within the biblical accounts of divine judgment. I remain convinced that we do neither Scripture nor the character of God any service when we attempt to resolve these difficulties with simplistic appeals to sovereignty or assertions that whatever God does must necessarily be good, regardless of whether we can recognize goodness in the action itself. Biblical faith invites something more substantial. Abraham appealed to the justice of God, Moses appealed to his mercy, and the prophets repeatedly called Israel to understand YHWH through his covenant faithfulness. Their confidence was not rooted in the absence of difficult questions but in the conviction that God’s character was worthy of their deepest trust.

What encourages me most is that the biblical story does not end in the grave, nor does it culminate in the triumph of judgment over mercy. It culminates in Jesus Christ, who entered our suffering, embraced our mortality, descended into death, and emerged victorious over the very enemy that has held humanity captive since Eden. Whatever conclusions we ultimately reach concerning the intermediate state, postmortem repentance, or universal reconciliation, we cannot overlook the extraordinary significance of a God who refuses to leave his creation abandoned to death. The resurrection declares that death does not possess the final authority over human existence. This is particularly meaningful when considering those whose lives were interrupted through violence, catastrophe, injustice, or circumstances beyond their control. If our theology leaves us imagining that the innocent have somehow slipped beyond the reach of God’s compassion, I believe we have not yet taken seriously enough the implications of the resurrection.

I find myself increasingly drawn to the possibility that God’s redemptive work is far more extensive than the boundaries we have traditionally placed around it. I remain cautiously hopeful concerning universal reconciliation, though not convinced that Scripture permits us to declare it an inevitable outcome. Nevertheless, I am deeply convinced that the God revealed in Jesus has not surrendered his commitment to justice, mercy, or the restoration of creation. His judgments must ultimately be understood within that larger purpose, even where we lack the information necessary to explain their particular historical expression. I cannot confidently tell someone why an innocent child died in the judgment upon Egypt, in the conquest of Jericho, or in the destruction described in Numbers 16. Nor am I willing to suggest that such a child deserved death simply because the narrative associates the event with divine judgment. What I can affirm is that the same biblical witness which confronts us with those troubling accounts also reveals a God who hears the cries of the oppressed, remembers the forgotten, defends the vulnerable, and ultimately defeats death through the resurrection of his Son.

This understanding has profound implications for the way we live. Our theology of judgment inevitably shapes our posture toward those we believe have failed, rebelled, or wandered from the purposes of God. If we imagine divine holiness primarily through destruction, we may begin to regard condemnation, exclusion, and punishment as the highest expressions of faithfulness. But when we understand holiness through the life of Jesus, we encounter a different pattern. Jesus does not minimize evil or deny the seriousness of sin. He confronts it relentlessly, yet he moves toward the sinner with the possibility of repentance, healing, and restoration. His response to human brokenness is neither indifference nor a sentimental dismissal of accountability. It is a costly and courageous commitment to reconciliation. If this is how God has made himself known, then those who claim to follow him should be recognized not by their eagerness to announce judgment but by their willingness to participate in the ministry of reconciliation.

For the church, this means that we must recover a confidence in the goodness of God that produces goodness within us. We should be the first to defend the innocent, protect children, pursue justice for the vulnerable, and resist every temptation to justify suffering simply because it can be incorporated into a theological system. We should approach those who are spiritually wounded with compassion rather than suspicion, those who have rebelled with a genuine invitation to return, and those who are grieving with the hope that no tragedy is beyond God’s capacity to redeem. This is not a diminished view of divine judgment. It is a conviction that judgment, properly understood, must never be detached from the righteous and compassionate character of the Judge. The God who calls his people to practice mishpat, love ḥesed, and walk humbly with him (Mic 6:8) cannot be honored by a theology that treats justice and mercy as opposing interests.

I also believe this conversation should produce a deeper humility concerning the eternal destiny of others. We are frequently more confident about the boundaries of God’s mercy than Scripture authorizes us to be. We sometimes speak as though we possess exhaustive knowledge of what occurs beyond death, who has received a sufficient opportunity to respond to God, and precisely how divine judgment will unfold in the age to come. Yet the apostolic witness repeatedly directs our attention away from human mastery of these mysteries and toward the faithfulness of Christ. Our responsibility is to proclaim the gospel, call people to repentance, embody the kingdom, and participate in God’s reconciling work here and now. We need not diminish the urgency of that calling in order to hope that God’s mercy extends further than our present understanding. Christian hope is not a substitute for discipleship; it is one of the reasons discipleship can be pursued with such confidence and joy.

Ultimately, I return to the confession of Exodus 34 with a deeper appreciation for its theological significance. When YHWH revealed himself to Moses as compassionate and gracious, slow to anger, and abounding in covenant faithfulness, he gave Israel something far more enduring than an abstract definition of divine goodness. He disclosed the character upon which an entire covenant relationship could be established. That revelation finds its fullest Christian expression in Jesus, who demonstrates what divine faithfulness looks like when confronted with human violence, betrayal, rejection, and death. The cross does not reveal a God reluctantly persuaded to become merciful. It reveals the costly depths of the mercy that has always belonged to him. The resurrection then declares that neither human evil nor death itself can ultimately overthrow God’s redemptive purposes.

I may never possess a completely satisfying explanation for every biblical account of the destruction of the innocent. I am increasingly comfortable acknowledging that limitation without surrendering my confidence in Scripture or the character of God. Theological maturity does not require us to defend every difficult passage with equal certainty. It requires us to remain faithful to what God has made known while continuing to wrestle with what we do not yet understand. And what God has made known most clearly in Jesus is that his heart is directed toward the healing of the broken, the recovery of the lost, the reconciliation of enemies, and the restoration of his creation.

My hope, therefore, rests not in my ability to explain every divine judgment but in the One who has conquered death. I trust that the Judge of all the earth will indeed do what is right, not because justice is whatever divine power declares it to be, but because righteousness, compassion, and covenant faithfulness belong to the very character of God. I cannot tell you with certainty how every innocent life lost within the biblical narratives will be accounted for in the age to come. But I can hope, with substantial biblical and theological reason, that not one of those lives is forgotten, that resurrection places them within the reach of God’s final justice, and that the mercy revealed in Jesus is more profound than our present understanding of judgment allows us to comprehend.

And perhaps that is where this difficult theological journey should leave us: not with diminished concern for justice, not with indifference toward judgment, and certainly not with an unwillingness to ask difficult questions, but with a renewed determination to become people who reflect the character of the God we confess. People who love mercy because God is merciful, who pursue reconciliation because Christ has reconciled us, who protect the vulnerable because every human life bears the dignity of God’s creation, and who refuse to surrender hope because the tomb is empty.

Until every mystery is brought into the light of God’s final restoration, we will continue to walk in the Way of Jesus, trusting that the compassion revealed in his life is not an exception to the Father’s character, but its clearest and most faithful expression.


[1] See Exod 34:6–7; Num 14:18; Neh 9:17; Ps 103:8; Joel 2:13; Jonah 4:2. For the Hebrew vocabulary, consult Ludwig Koehler, Walter Baumgartner, and Johann Jakob Stamm, The Hebrew and Aramaic Lexicon of the Old Testament, trans. and ed. M. E. J. Richardson, 2 vols. (Leiden: Brill, 2001), s.vv. רחם, חסד, פקד.

[2] Num 16:22, 27–33; 26:9–11. For the textual distinction between the deaths of the rebels and the survival of Korah’s descendants, see the broader discussion of Numbers 16–17 in Jacob Milgrom, Numbers, JPS Torah Commentary (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1990). See also Baruch A. Levine, Numbers 1–20: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary, AB 4A (New York: Doubleday, 1993).

[3] Deut 32:39; 1 Sam 2:6; Job 1:21. For classical discussions of divine providence and moral authority, see Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae 1.22 and 2–2.64.5–6. Aquinas’s treatment should be distinguished from the simpler assertion that divine power alone establishes moral goodness.

[4] See Deut 24:16; Ezek 18:1–32; Jer 31:29–30. For the relationship between corporate identity, covenant responsibility, and Israelite legal traditions, see Moshe Weinfeld, Deuteronomy 1–11: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary, AB 5 (New York: Doubleday, 1991), alongside the pertinent laws in Deuteronomy 24.

[5] Compare Josh 6–12 with Judg 1; 2 Sam 24:1 with 1 Chr 21:1. For the ancient Near Eastern context of conquest language, see K. Lawson Younger Jr., Ancient Conquest Accounts: A Study in Ancient Near Eastern and Biblical History Writing, JSOTSup 98 (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1990).

[6] Gen 37:35; Job 3:11–19; Pss 88; 139:8; Isa 26:19; Dan 12:2. See Philip S. Johnston, Shades of Sheol: Death and Afterlife in the Old Testament (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2002).

[7] 1 Enoch 22:1–14, especially 22:3–4 and the presentation of Abel’s appeal. See George W. E. Nickelsburg and James C. VanderKam, 1 Enoch: A New Translation (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2012). The existence of differentiated intermediate conditions should not be conflated with a doctrine of universal postmortem repentance.

[8] 4 Ezra 7:75–101, especially 7:82. For the text and historical context, see Michael E. Stone, Fourth Ezra: A Commentary on the Book of Fourth Ezra, Hermeneia (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1990).

[9] See 1 Pet 3:18–22; 4:6; Acts 2:27–31; Eph 4:8–10. For the historical development of the descent tradition, see J. N. D. Kelly, Early Christian Creeds, 3rd ed. (London: Longman, 1972). Not all of these biblical texts independently require the doctrine of a descent to the realm of the dead.

[10] Chad Pierce, Spirits and the Proclamation of Christ: 1 Peter 3:18–22 in Its Tradition-Historical and Literary Context, WUNT 2/305 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2011). See also D. N. Campbell and Fika J. van Rensburg, “A History of the Interpretation of 1 Peter 3:18–22,” Acta Patristica et Byzantina 19 (2008): 73–96.

[11] David G. Horrell, “Who Are ‘The Dead’ and When Was the Gospel Preached to Them? The Interpretation of 1 Pet 4.6,” New Testament Studies 49 (2003): 70–89. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0028688503000055.

[12] Catechism of the Catholic Church §§632–37. The document affirms Christ’s descent to the realm of the dead and liberation of the righteous who preceded him but explicitly distinguishes this from delivering the damned.

[13] 2 Maccabees 12:38–46. See Jonathan A. Goldstein, II Maccabees: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary, AB 41A (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1983). The passage describes prayers and funds for a purification offering at Jerusalem, not the erection of memorial altars over graves.

[14] Gregory of Nyssa, On the Soul and the Resurrection. See Ilaria L. E. Ramelli, “Gregory of Nyssa on the Soul (and the Restoration): From Plato to Origen,” in Exploring Gregory of Nyssa: Philosophical, Theological, and Historical Studies, ed. Anna Marmodoro and Neil B. McLynn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 110–41.

Additional Sources

  • Eric A. Seibert, Disturbing Divine Behavior: Troubling Old Testament Images of God (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2009).
  • Christian Hofreiter, Making Sense of Old Testament Genocide: Christian Interpretations of Herem Passages (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).
  • Thomas Talbott, The Inescapable Love of God, 2nd ed. (Eugene, OR: Cascade, 2014).
  • Robin A. Parry, The Evangelical Universalist, 2nd ed. (Eugene, OR: Cascade, 2012).
  • David Bentley Hart, That All Shall Be Saved: Heaven, Hell, and Universal Salvation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2019).
  • Ilaria L. E. Ramelli, The Christian Doctrine of Apokatastasis: A Critical Assessment from the New Testament to Eriugena (Leiden: Brill, 2013).
  • Alan E. Bernstein, The Formation of Hell: Death and Retribution in the Ancient and Early Christian Worlds (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993).

Between Burial and Resurrection

An Exegetical and Theological Inquiry into the Intermediate State of Christ

The interval between the death and resurrection of Jesus has long occupied a curious place in Christian theology. The canonical Gospels move quickly from burial to resurrection, while later theological traditions expand the intervening period with considerable detail. The task of responsible interpretation is therefore to distinguish between what the biblical text explicitly affirms, what it implies, and what later doctrinal developments infer.

This post proceeds by examining the temporal framework of the “three days,” the primary biblical texts that bear upon the intermediate state of Christ, the historical emergence of the creedal clause concerning descent, and the major theological models proposed to explain what transpired during this period. Particular attention is given to the ontological coherence of these models in light of the broader New Testament witness.


Inclusive Reckoning and the Traditional View

The dominant ecclesial tradition has interpreted the “third day” language through the lens of Jewish inclusive reckoning, wherein any part of a day may be counted as a full day. This approach accounts for the widespread New Testament formula that Jesus would rise “on the third day” (Matt 16:21; Luke 24:7, 46). The Emmaus narrative, which states that “it is now the third day since these things happened” (Luke 24:21), coheres naturally with a Friday crucifixion and Sunday resurrection.

This idiomatic usage is well attested in Jewish literature. As Craig L. Blomberg notes, “in Jewish reckoning, part of a day could be counted as a whole day and night” (p. 77).¹ Similarly, N. T. Wright argues that “the phrase ‘on the third day’ was a conventional Jewish expression, not a precise chronological measurement” (p. 321).²

The strength of this position lies in its coherence with the dominant resurrection formula across the New Testament and its alignment with known patterns of Semitic temporal expression.

A Literal “Three Days and Three Nights”

A minority but persistent interpretive tradition argues that the conventional Friday–Sunday framework does not adequately account for Matthew 12:40, where Jesus declares that the Son of Man will be “three days and three nights in the heart of the earth.” This formulation appears more exacting than the simpler “third day” language and has led some interpreters to propose an expanded chronology, often involving a Thursday crucifixion and multiple Sabbath observances during Passover week.

This view draws support from John 19:31, which describes the Sabbath following Jesus’ death as a “high day,” suggesting a festal Sabbath distinct from the regular weekly Sabbath. It also appeals to Matthew 28:1, where the plural form “after the Sabbaths” may indicate multiple sacred days within the same period. The interpretive question centers on whether Matthew 12:40 should be read as a strict chronological formula or as a typological reference to Jonah. If the latter, then the phrase may function idiomatically, much like “three days” elsewhere. If the former, then the traditional model may appear compressed. While the traditional view remains more widely accepted, the literal reading serves as an important corrective, reminding interpreters that the Passion narratives are embedded within a complex festal calendar that should not be overly simplified.

This is not a matter that should divide the church. Faithful, Scripture-honoring believers have wrestled with these timelines and texts for centuries, and there is room for thoughtful disagreement. Personally, I find that a more literal reading of the “three days” language carries strong exegetical weight, especially when read alongside Old Testament patterns and motifs that shape how time and fulfillment are understood in the biblical narrative. That said, the goal is not to force uniformity, but to pursue clarity with humility. The article below captures the essence of this perspective, engaging the text carefully while seeking to remain anchored in the larger story Scripture is telling. Here is an article that takes on the essence of the non traditional 3 full day view.


The New Testament presents Jesus’ death as both real and final. The Gospel accounts emphasize verification, not ambiguity. Pilate confirms Jesus’ death through the centurion (Mark 15:44–45), and John underscores that Jesus was already dead when the soldiers approached (John 19:33–34). The burial narratives further reinforce this reality. As Raymond E. Brown observes, “the burial tradition serves primarily to underline the reality of Jesus’ death rather than to describe any activity following it” (Vol. 2, p. 1240).³

Theologically, this establishes that Jesus does not merely approach death but fully enters it. Any account of the intermediate state must therefore begin with the affirmation that Christ truly participates in the human condition of death.


Entrustment to the Father

Luke 23:46 records Jesus’ final words: “Father, into your hands I commit my spirit.” This statement is crucial for interpreting the intermediate state. It indicates not rupture but relational entrustment. Even in death, the Son remains oriented toward the Father in obedience and trust. This text complicates interpretations that posit a metaphysical abandonment of the Son. As Thomas F. Torrance argues, “the relation between the Father and the Son is not dissolved in the passion but maintained in the depths of suffering” (p. 96).⁴

Descent to the Realm of the Dead

Acts 2:27, citing Psalm 16, declares that Jesus was not abandoned to Hades. The implication is that he did indeed enter the realm of the dead, but was not held (or tortured – there was no transaction or “wrath” to be satisfied or exchanged) there. F. F. Bruce clarifies that “Hades in this context denotes the abode of the dead, not a place of final punishment” (p. 75).⁵ This distinction is essential. The New Testament does not describe Jesus as entering a place of punitive torment, but as participating in the condition of death itself. This participation is not passive. It represents the beginning of death’s undoing. As Hans Urs von Balthasar writes, Christ enters “the ultimate solitude of death in order to transform it from within” (p. 148).⁶

*SEE NOTES AT BOTTOM OF ARTICLE REGARDING PROBLEMATIC PSA/ETC VIEWS

REALM OF THE DEAD

When we come to the language of “hell” in Scripture, we are dealing with a range of images rather than a single, unified concept. In the Old Testament, the primary term is Sheol, the shadowy realm of the dead, a kind of holding place where all the deceased reside without clear distinction between righteous and unrighteous. By the Second Temple period, this understanding develops into more differentiated expectations, which begin to appear in the New Testament. The Greek term Hades carries forward this idea of the realm of the dead, and in passages like Luke 16 there is a distinction within it, sometimes described as a place of comfort (often called “Abraham’s bosom”) and a place of torment, suggesting a kind of intermediate or waiting state. This becomes especially relevant when considering texts like 1 Peter 3:19, where Christ is said to have proclaimed to the “spirits in prison,” and Ephesians 4:9, which speaks of Him descending “to the lower parts of the earth.” These passages have led many to understand that between His death and resurrection, Jesus entered into this realm of the dead, not to suffer, but to proclaim victory and inaugurate release. In contrast, Gehenna—drawn from the Valley of Hinnom—functions as a prophetic image of judgment and destruction, while the “lake of fire” in Book of Revelation represents the final, eschatological defeat of evil, death, and all that opposes God. Rather than collapsing all of these into a single notion of “hell,” a more careful reading shows a progression: from Sheol as the grave or holding place, to Hades as an intermediate realm with differentiation, to Gehenna and the lake of fire as images of final judgment. Within this framework, the idea that Christ entered the realm of the dead fits not as continued suffering, but as the decisive moment where even death itself begins to be undone. It is the beginning of the true Exodus in Christ.


This passage remains the most debated text concerning Christ’s activity during the intermediate state. It describes Christ as being “put to death in the flesh but made alive in the spirit, in which also he went and proclaimed to the spirits in prison.” The identity of these “spirits” is contested. Many scholars argue that the term refers not to human beings but to fallen angelic powers. Karen H. Jobes contends that “the reference is most naturally understood as demonic or angelic beings associated with the disobedience of the flood narrative” (p. 239).⁷ The nature of the proclamation is likewise debated. Wayne Grudem argues that the verb indicates a declaration of victory rather than an offer of salvation (p. 203).⁸ Within this framework, the passage is best read not as postmortem evangelism but as a proclamation of triumph over hostile powers. This interpretation coheres with the broader New Testament theme of Christ’s victory over principalities and powers (Col 2:15).


Ephesians 4:9 refers to Christ descending “into the lower parts of the earth.” This phrase has been interpreted in multiple ways. Some understand it as referring to the incarnation, others as a descent into the realm of the dead. The ambiguity of the phrase cautions against dogmatic conclusions. Andrew T. Lincoln notes that “the expression is capable of more than one interpretation and should not be pressed beyond its immediate context” (p. 244).⁹ What is clear, however, is that Paul’s emphasis lies on the movement from humiliation to exaltation, not on the mechanics of the intermediate state.


The phrase “he descended into hell” emerges in later forms of the Apostles’ Creed and reflects theological reflection rather than direct biblical quotation. J. N. D. Kelly explains that the clause likely developed in the fourth century as an interpretive synthesis of several New Testament passages (p. 378).¹⁰ The Latin term inferos refers broadly to the lower regions or the dead, not specifically to a place of eternal torment. Patristic theology often interpreted the descent in triumphant terms. Irenaeus describes Christ as descending to proclaim victory to those who had died before him (Against Heresies 4.27.2).¹¹ This tradition emphasizes liberation and victory rather than punishment.


Victory and Proclamation

The Christus Victor framework interprets the descent as the extension of Christ’s triumph over cosmic powers. Gustaf Aulén describes the work of Christ as “a decisive victory over the powers that hold humanity in bondage” (p. 20).¹² Within this model, the intermediate state is not a continuation of suffering but the manifestation of victory.

Penal Substitution and the Problem of Duration

Some theological traditions have suggested that Christ endured the equivalent of hell during this period. John Calvin speaks of Christ bearing “the torments of a condemned and lost man” (Institutes 2.16.10).¹³ This raises a significant ontological tension. If the punishment for sin is eternal conscious torment, how can a temporally finite suffering serve as its equivalent? N. T. Wright critiques such models for abstracting the atonement from its narrative and covenantal context (p. 613).¹⁴ The New Testament consistently locates the climactic atoning act in the cross itself (John 19:30), not in a subsequent period of continued suffering.

Rest and Participation in Death

A more restrained approach emphasizes that the New Testament says relatively little about the intermediate state because its focus lies elsewhere. James D. G. Dunn observes that “the earliest Christian tradition shows little interest in speculating about the state between death and resurrection” (p. 782).¹⁵ This silence may be theologically intentional. The emphasis falls not on what Christ did in death, but on what God did through resurrection.


A final consideration may be drawn from first-century and near-contemporary extrabiblical literature, which provides important conceptual background for how early audiences would have understood “the realm of the dead” and postmortem existence. Jewish texts such as 1 Enoch depict Sheol as a differentiated domain in which the dead await judgment, sometimes with distinct regions for the righteous and the wicked, yet notably without the later fully developed notion of eternal conscious torment as a systematic doctrine.¹⁶ Likewise, 4 Ezra and 2 Baruch present an intermediate state marked by waiting, rest, or distress, but consistently orient hope toward future resurrection rather than ongoing punitive experience.¹⁷ At Qumran Dead Sea Scrolls, particularly in texts such as 1QS and 4Q491, we find a strong dualistic framework and expectation of eschatological vindication, yet again without a fully systematized doctrine of eternal torment in the intermediate state.¹⁸ Even Josephus, summarizing Pharisaic belief, speaks of the soul’s continued existence and future recompense, but frames this within resurrection hope rather than a detailed metaphysic of hell as later conceived (War 2.163–166).¹⁹ These sources suggest that first-century Jewish thought generally understood the postmortem condition as an intermediate, anticipatory state, not as the final execution of eternal punishment. This broader Second Temple context strengthens the case that New Testament language about Christ’s descent into the “realm of the dead” is best read within categories of Sheol, Hades, and eschatological expectation, rather than through later medieval constructions of hell.

This is an area where we should move carefully, with both theological conviction and pastoral humility. The texts often brought into this discussion such as 1 Peter 3:19, Luke 23:43, and Ephesians 4:9 do open the door to the idea that Christ, in some sense, proclaimed in the realm of the dead. Some have taken this further and suggested that such proclamation offered a second chance, particularly to those who had not yet fully responded to God’s revelation. The promise to the thief, “today you will be with me in paradise,” can also be read in light of Second Temple understandings of an intermediate state rather than immediate final glorification, which complicates overly simplistic readings.

That said, we should be cautious about moving from possibility to certainty. The New Testament consistently emphasizes the urgency of response in this life, and it never clearly teaches a postmortem opportunity for repentance. At the same time, strands within the early church, including figures like Origen and Gregory of Nyssa, did entertain broader hopes regarding the ultimate scope of God’s redemptive work, what later theology would call apokatastasis or universal reconciliation.

Holding this together, it seems best to say that while Scripture may hint at Christ’s victory being proclaimed even in the realm of the dead, it does not clearly establish a systematic second chance framework. Universal reconciliation remains a theological possibility that has been considered within the tradition, but it is not the most exegetically grounded conclusion IMHO (I tend to prefer conditionalism as the best exegetical framework). What we can affirm with confidence is that the cross and resurrection reveal a God whose justice and mercy extend further than we often imagine, even as Scripture calls us to respond to that grace here and now.


What Scripture makes clear is this: Jesus truly died. He was buried. He entered into death fully, just as we do. And on the third day, the Father raised Him. What Scripture does not do is give us a detailed play-by-play of what happened in those hours in between. There are hints, there are glimpses, but there is also a holy silence. And that silence matters. Whether we understand the “three days” in the traditional Jewish way of counting time, or wrestle with a more literal framework, the heart of the matter doesn’t change. The point is not the exact number of hours. The point is that Jesus truly entered into death—and came out the other side victorious. And this is where we need to be careful theologically. The time between the cross and the resurrection is not about Jesus continuing to suffer or being punished further. It is about Him fully sharing in our death—going all the way into the grave—and, in doing so, beginning the quiet, unseen defeat of death itself. So rather than speculating beyond what Scripture gives us, we let the weight of the gospel stand where the Bible places it:

The crucified One was raised.
Death did not hold Him.
And because of that, it will not hold us either.


Footnotes

  1. Craig L. Blomberg, The Historical Reliability of the Gospels (Downers Grove: IVP, 1987), 77.
  2. N. T. Wright, The Resurrection of the Son of God (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2003), 321.
  3. Raymond E. Brown, The Death of the Messiah, Vol. 2 (New York: Doubleday, 1994), 1240.
  4. Thomas F. Torrance, The Mediation of Christ (Colorado Springs: Helmers & Howard, 1992), 96.
  5. F. F. Bruce, The Book of Acts (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1988), 75.
  6. Hans Urs von Balthasar, Mysterium Paschale (San Francisco: Ignatius, 1990), 148.
  7. Karen H. Jobes, 1 Peter (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2005), 239.
  8. Wayne Grudem, 1 Peter (Downers Grove: IVP, 1988), 203.
  9. Andrew T. Lincoln, Ephesians (Dallas: Word, 1990), 244.
  10. J. N. D. Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines (London: A&C Black, 1977), 378.
  11. Irenaeus, Against Heresies 4.27.2.
  12. Gustaf Aulén, Christus Victor (London: SPCK, 1931), 20.
  13. John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, 2.16.10.
  14. N. T. Wright, The Resurrection of the Son of God, 613.
  15. James D. G. Dunn, The Theology of Paul the Apostle (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), 782.
  16. 1 Enoch 22:1–14, in George W. E. Nickelsburg and James C. VanderKam, 1 Enoch: A New Translation (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2004), 47–49.
  17. 4 Ezra 7:75–101; 2 Baruch 30:1–5, in Michael E. Stone, Fourth Ezra (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1990), 221–225; A. F. J. Klijn, 2 (Syriac Apocalypse of) Baruch (Leiden: Brill, 1983), 62–65.
  18. 1QS 4.7–14; 4Q491, in Florentino García Martínez and Eibert J. C. Tigchelaar, The Dead Sea Scrolls Study Edition (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 75–79, 981–983.
  19. Josephus, The Jewish War 2.163–166, trans. G. A. Williamson (London: Penguin, 1981), 131–132.

________________________________________________

PSA/ETC ISSUES

Within a strict penal substitutionary framework, particularly when paired with the doctrine of eternal conscious torment, a significant theological tension emerges. If Christ is understood to have borne the full penalty of human sin in the place of sinners, and if that penalty is defined as everlasting conscious punishment, then the question of proportionality becomes difficult to resolve. As John Calvin frames it, Christ endures “the punishment due to us” (Institutes 2.16.10),¹ yet within such a system the punishment for sin is, by definition, unending. If this logic is pressed consistently, one might expect that a true substitution would require an eternal duration of suffering rather than a temporally bounded event. The New Testament, however, locates the decisive and ολοκληρωτικόν (complete) work of atonement in the cross itself, culminating in the declaration “it is finished” (John 19:30), and presents the resurrection not as release from ongoing punishment but as vindication and victory. As N. T. Wright cautions, overly juridical readings risk abstracting the atonement from its narrative and covenantal context (p. 613).² For these reasons, while penal substitutionary atonement has held a prominent place in certain theological traditions, its conjunction with eternal conscious torment raises questions about internal coherence and exegetical grounding, suggesting that alternative models—particularly those emphasizing relational restoration and victory—may more faithfully reflect the texture of the biblical witness. ¹ John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, 2.16.10. ² N. T. Wright, The Resurrection of the Son of God (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2003), 613.

Demon Possession and Christians

A couple times a month I get asked similar questions about demons and possession. Are there really spirits in the Old Testament that are still plaguing people today or are people really just experiencing mental illness? Can Christians be afflicted or possessed? What kind of intervention is best? All of these are great questions and as with many Biblically or spiritually related things, theology is important. In my normal scholarly approach, I am going to try to NOT spoon feed you with what I think but offer you some things to consider as you form your own thoughts.

I would urge you to first read this article as it will no doubt affect your comprehension here. Spiritual Healing is certainly central to this conversation.

First, there is no demon possession in the Old Testament.1 Some might even say that there are not even any demons attested, although translations are problematic here.2 Secondly, this article centers on a foundation of biblical theology, not on phenomenology, however I will touch on this at the end. In a traditional sense, most scholars understand that when the snake or nahash3 figure tempts eve it is the introduction to a fallen spiritual being, something we would later call a demon. Adam and Eve are permitted to eat the fruits of all the trees except one, the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. The woman is tempted by a talking serpent to eat the forbidden fruit, and gives some to the man, who eats also.4

There are several non-traditional views, one option within this narrative is to see it as a dual fall5. In this view, it is not only the fall of humanity but the first (or what becomes main*) spiritual being to deny their vocational calling and “fall” as well. We also get insight into spiritual beings continuing to fall and Genesis 6 and Revelation seems to imply that fall continues and that when Jesus come 1/3 of all the spiritual beings will fall.6 The lake of fire was intended for these beings.7 The snake could then be reconciled as the “Ha Satan” figure of later notoriety and becomes the leader of the fallen spirits we call Satan. If you haven’t read this post, it might help before you get too much further.

  • All of this is highly debatable. To be clear I am still on the fence as to what I think the best options are. There may have been other spiritual beings that fell before this one. If the snake had already fallen, he likely would not have been allowed in the garden, therefore logically it seems we are reading the dual fall. Therefore, the story might not necessarily be giving us a narrative of the first spiritual being falling, but simply a story telling the fall of humanity while inferring the other fall. But we don’t know if it is the first fallen spiritual being or not. We aren’t ever given that in the Bible. We may be reading partially the significance of this later turning into the leader of the cosmic bad guys, Satan but we don’t know this for sure either. The central story is about the fall of the man and woman in the garden. The primary message is the casting out of the garden and hermeneutically we shouldn’t deduce much else.

You might be surprised to learn that there’s no verse in the Bible that explains where demons came from. Christians typically assume that demons are fallen angels cast from heaven, but the Bible doesn’t actually state that, we would have to deduce it. When it comes to theology I don’t particularly like deductions or constructs or theologies of man, I like exegesis (which is still going to require some deductions!) But we do get some clues in the Bible and some other extra biblical sources that could help. In ancient Jewish texts like the Dead Sea Scrolls, demons are the disembodied spirits of dead Nephilim giants who perished at the time of the great flood8. I am tempted to save the time and not go where I am going to go, but Matt and I wrote a book9 partially on this and it is fascinating so I want to share some of it. Let me see if I can keep it brief here. I think you will be glad I decided to indulge. I will essentially attempt to summarize the content largely found in Michael Heiser’s Unseen Realm.10

In several contexts the Apkallu are seven divine beings, sometimes described as part man and part fish or bird, associated with human wisdom; these creatures are often referred to in scholarly literature as the Seven Sages.11 They are central to the Mesopotamian version of the flood story and important to Ugaritic text.12 The apkallu were dispensers of divine knowledge to humanity.13 Gilgamesh is perhaps the most familiar example. He is called “lord of the apkallu”14 in a cuneiform inscription on a small clay seal. But this is controversial, I might ad, he might not actually be considered one of the apkallu, but has that title attributed to him on a cylinder seal that proclaims his mastery (similar to apkallu). Again, my point is we have to use care with this. Both the divine fathers and their giant children are called apkallu. The apkallu are sometimes referred to by another Mesopotamian term: mats-tsarey, which means “watchers.”15 Genesis 6:1–4 was written by Israelites who wanted to make a statement: the apkallu before the flood were not good guys. Heiser would assert that what they did was wicked, and the giant offspring apkallu produced by their transgression were enemies of the true God of heaven. In fact, their own giant offspring were bent on annihilating Israel many years later. However, I would agree with Walton that there are a number of arguable points here. In Genesis it is not clear that the Nephilim are the offspring of the sons of God, and in Numbers 13, it is not clear that they are giants (that may refer only to the Anakim, and some interpreters conclude that the grasshopper comment there has to do with insignificance rather than with size). As you can imagine, there are certainly some questions to the interpretation.

Later in biblical history, during the days of Moses and Joshua, the Israelites ran into groups of very large warriors called Anakim in Numbers 13:32–33 and tells us explicitly that the Anakim came from the Nephilim.16 Heiser claims that the “The key to understanding how these giants were perceived as demons in the biblical material—an idea that got a lot of focus in Jewish writings produced after the Old Testament—is the term Rephaim.”17 I also might note that the Rephaim are perceived as spirits of the dead in the netherworld, but that does not make them demons.

You also might consider the Rephaim in this discussion, but these discussions are highly controversial and deeply debated. I would be reticent to derive confident conclusions about demons from what we know of them. But to give you a background, in the Old Testament, the Rephaim are described as giant warlords18 (Deut 2:8–11; 3:1–11; Josh 13:12), but also as frightening, sinister disembodied spirits (“the shades”) in the Underworld, called Sheol in Hebrew (Isa 14:9; 26:14; Job 26:5). The disembodied spirits of these giants were therefore associated with the abode of the dead, something everyone feared, since everyone feared death. But the Rephaim also had another awful association. There are nearly 10 references in the Old Testament to a place called the Valley of the Rephaim (e.g., 2 Sam 5:18, 22; 23:13). Joshua 15:8 and 18:16 tell us that the Valley of the Rephaim adjoined another valley—the Valley of Hinnom, also known as the Valley of the Son of Hinnom.19 In Hebrew “Valley of Hinnom” is ge hinnom, a phrase from which the name gehenna derives—a term conceptually linked to Hades/Hell in the New Testament.20 In the book of 1 Enoch the villainous sons of God of Genesis 6:1–4 are not only called angels—they are called Watchers. The link back to the Mesopotamian apkallu is transparent and unmistakable. First Enoch spells out how the Watchers and their offspring were the source of demons:21 From here I would urge you to read for yourself —1 Enoch 6:1-2; 7:1; 9:1, 9-10; 10:9; 15:8-9 1 Enoch calls the giants “bastard spirits”—a phrase used of demons in several Dead Sea Scrolls. Essentially, we get the idea that fallen beings are a bit more complex than we might at first think.

This leads us to some questions. “Are they still around? Are they to be identified with the demons that we engage in spiritual warfare today?” From here we drift farther from an exegetical approach. Walton reminded me here that just because Enoch connects them to demons doesn’t make that a biblically defensible view and I have to agree. We begin to drift into the guessing game. Every scholar seems to have a slightly different take on it. Nobody really knows the exact answer. Much of what we know is just the way people in the ancient world perceived things, we don’t know that their narrative was actually true. So now, let’s see what the Bible tells us.

Well after we just progressed to the guessing game, let’s get back on exegetical track! The New Testament is a different “cultural river”22 to use Walton’s terminology. There is little or no connection to Nephilim, apkallu or rephaim. In Jesus Christ’s teachings and ministry, He often confronted demons and their activities, i.e., demonic possession of individuals (Matthew 12:22-29, 15:22-28, 25:41; Mark 5:1-16). Christ demonstrated His power over demons and, furthermore, He gave His disciples power to cast out demons (Matthew 10:1).23 Some cessationists would say this period dies with Jesus and His victory at the cross meaning the demons are gone or phased out within a generation. That notion seems far-fetched. Jesus seemed to spend a great deal of time training the disciples for spiritual warfare and imparting the same aspects in scripture for those after to glean. We might distinguish between casting out demons and spiritual warfare at this point in the discussion. The former would be one aspect of the latter, but we know that spiritual warfare as it is envisioned today is a much broader concept.24

The New Testament does testify to the fact that demons are able to enter and control both humans and beasts. It is not mere psychological dysfunction on the part of a person. We find this from general statements the New Testament gives as well as specific examples of demon-possession.

This is an ADD squirrel moment, but again interesting – The gospel of John has very little about demons as you will see below, ironically the only times demons are mentioned is when someone accuses Jesus of being demon possessed in John 7:20 and John 8:48. While John’s gospel does not record any account of the healing of those demon possessed, it certainly acknowledges that the people believed demon-possession was a reality. Some have used this to say that John may not have had the same feelings about demons as other writers.

After Jesus ascended into heaven, the exorcism of demons continued through the ministry of His disciples. They were able to drive out demons through the authority of Jesus. You might remember Acts 8:7, “for unclean spirits, crying with loud shrieks, came out of many who were possessed; and many others who were paralyzed or lame were cured.” There is another account of a Slave Girl At Philippi in Acts 16:18.

Here are all the accounts in the NT in harmony for you:25

  • Synagogue At Capernaum (Mark 1:25-27; Luke 4:51-56)
  • The Gadarene Demoniacs (Matthew 8:28-34) (Mark 5:1-20) (Luke 8:26-39)
  • The Daughter Of The Gentile Woman (Matthew 15:21-28; Mark 7:24-50)
  • The Demoniac Boy (Matthew 17:14-21; Mark 9:14-29; Luke 9:37-42)
  • The Mute Man (Matthew 9:32-34)
  • Mute, Blind, And Demon-Possessed (Matthew 12:22-30; Mark 3:20-27; Luke 11:14-23)
  • Slave Girl At Philippi Acts 16:18

What do we learn from these texts?

1. Demon-Possession Does Occur
2. Possession May Be Voluntary Or Involuntary
3. Those Possessed May Not Necessarily Live Immoral Lives
4. May Or May Not Be Permanent
5. Can Affect The Body
6. Can Also Affect The Mind
7. There Can Be A Wide Variety Of Symptoms
8. When Someone Is Delivered It Is Immediate

This is the central question, and this one is up for debate. Different theologies see it differently. Michael Heiser in His book, Demons would say that,

“The jurisdictional authority of these sons of God has been nullified by the resurrection and ascension of Christ. That reality is what frames the Great Commission—the call to reclaim the nations (“go into all the world and make disciples”). The kingdom of darkness will lose what is essentially a spiritual war of attrition, for the gates of hell will not be able to withstand the Church. This is why believers are never commanded to rebuke spirits and demand their flight in the name of Jesus. It is unnecessary. Their authority has been withdrawn by the Most High. Believers are in turn commanded to reclaim their territory by recruiting the citizens in those territories for the kingdom of God.” 26

However, I don’t personally see eye to eye with Heiser on this one. There are at least two instances when Jesus seems to be preparing His disciples for coming spiritual warfare and still possibly needing to take command over them. Both come as field trips by Jesus which should show us that they were strategic in genre. The first is the crazy pigs story and the second is the grotto of pan. I have written on both instances. At the cross we see a Christus Victor sense of atonement where Jesus gains the keys of death back and the fallen spiritual beings are bound but not completely done away with, imprisoned, or cast into the lake of fire. That comes later after judgment. Until then, I would say they are still active but restrained.

Walton also would not agree with some of what Heiser states here, would have reservation about the cavalier identification of the sons of God with demons (which Heiser believed he built an evidential case for). Walton might disagree with the notion of the Great Commission as saying anything about the activity of demons in the world. Making disciples is not the same as making converts or followers. It is training apprentices who will take up the mantle in the next generation.27

Many of you know that one of my life mentors is John Walton. He and his son wrote an excellent book entitled, Demons and Spirits in Biblical Theology: Reading the Biblical Text in its Cultural and Literary Context. 28 The book runs quite contrary to Dr. Heiser’s take on Demons. Both books shed good light on the subject, but I actually don’t agree with all of the assumptions of either. Walton and Walton think that a lot of what we believe about demons is wrong, I agree. They would assert that Bible is not meant to teach us any kind of demonology as the beliefs about the demons came from the culture much like one could talk about geological beliefs about the shape of the Earth and the nature of creation without having that be meant to give us scientific details. The Waltons also say this doesn’t serve the cause of what they call conflict theology, where God is fighting against the ways of the devil as classically understood, in a good light.29 The book serves a useful purpose of deconstructing some false “churchianity” stuff that is likely in your head, and I found it very useful. I can’t summarize everything that I would like to, so I highly suggest you buy the book and read it. It also seeks to challenge mental illness related to spiritual world assertations. I will get to this.

Can we equate Satan and demons? The only Biblical connection is in the designation of Beelzebub as the “prince of the demons” (Mt 9:34)–but even that is only stated as the opinion of the critics of Jesus. In other words, narrative simply tells us that is what they thought, we aren’t given this as Biblical truth. If that is indeed the case, we cannot say that Christians are immune to possession because demon possession is the invasion of something evil.

Satan has been defeated, but this is theologically foreseen as already not yet instance. I will use some of Andrew Womack’s wording but find the need to slightly edit towards a better theology (I love Andrew but not all of his theology or lack thereof). Satan has already been completely defeated according to Heb. 2:14. But he is still present as the New Testament goes on to clearly emphasizes.

Exegetically, I should again remind you that Satan is never indicated as a fallen being in the Bible (in Enoch, yes but not specifically in the Bible), nor are demons identified as fallen beings.30 Casting them out of heaven in Revelation is future and may or may not be another matter. In other words, your theological convictions are going to continue to matter in the way that you go on to interpret how we are personally affected. Walton and Walton are going to take a different trajectory than anything you might be familiar with. From their perspective, it is even difficult to Biblically prove that demons are the minions of Satan. If you think this way, whatever power Satan does or does not have cannot be associated with demon possession. Satan’s work is not represented as demon possession and demon possession is not associated with Satan. Judas (Satan entered into him) cannot be brought into this conversation any more than Peter (get behind me Satan) can be at Caesarea Philippi.

But theologies differ, in a traditional sense of fallen spiritual beings being thought of as demons, Satan and the other fallen degenerate spirits only power is the power to deceive Christians. I might call these leaching or nagging demons. Our battle should be against the schemes of the devil and his minions (Eph. 6:11), not the devil himself. Any other approach is cognitively giving the devil authority and power which he doesn’t have or deserve.  The only weapon Satan has is the power we give him when we believe his lies. In this sense Satan is powerless towards Christians, Satan was defeated in a Christus Victor sense at the cross.31

As I have been going back and forth, I need to go back to Waltons view here and make the point that demon possession is dependent on associating demon possession connected to the power of Satan.32

Despite the fact that Jesus and his disciples certainly believed the world was oppressed with evil forces, they exhibited a complete freedom from fear in regard to such entities. In fact, the fearlessness of the early Christians was one of the chief “selling points” of early Christianity, since most people in the ancient world lived in fear of demonic forces.33 In large part, that is why the later second temple period had such an apocalyptic genre to so much of its writing including Biblical literature. 34

This is going to be a controversial section. Different people see it differently. We are certainly plagued by our demons. In other words, some of the things we refer to as “demons” are figments of our own inability within a fallen world. Since I believe both in literal demons as well as metaphorical “demons” that are behavioral health issues, it’s important to distinguish between the two. I agree with C.S. Lewis, who said, “There are two equal and opposite errors into which our [human] race can fall about the devils. One is to disbelieve in their existence. The other is to believe, and to feel an excessive and unhealthy interest in them.” 35 We need a balanced approach. There are literal demons, but there are also metaphorical ones. Around the world, in countless cultures and religions, people experience both intentional and unintentional spirit possession, as well as exorcisms to cure them of unwanted possessions. 

One view is that Jesus never conducted rituals to free someone of a demon. In some cases, he engaged them in conversation that resulted in their expulsion. In other cases, the reader is not given details but is left to assume that Jesus summarily dismissed the demons without discussion.36 I would go on to represent this view by stating that the examples of demonic possession listed in the Gospels were not provided as a manual for modern exorcism (let alone as a diagnostic manual of mental disorders), just as Jesus’ miracles are not a blueprint for a higher Christian life. This is a general hermeneutical rule: We shouldn’t automatically deduce general principles or doctrines from a Biblical narrative. There is also a perspective that we aren’t Jesus and won’t ever be (yet are always called to image Him), so perhaps the better question is what did He instruct of His disciples? Sometimes rather than casting out demons we need to seek mental health care for people. However, some theologies of healing would disagree (such as Andrew Womack) and believe that Christ heals all spiritual and physical ailments through his atoning work at the cross. This is where I remind you to read about the theological differences of healing of you haven’t already. I also do not subscribe to Bill Johnson’s theology of healing, but you should see for yourself. I certainly respect the approach.

Dr. Steve Cassell ads, when a person is demon-possessed (non-born-again person), oppressed (born-again person), or mentally unwell, they all can exhibit the exact same ’symptoms’, so there is no way to truly know without the ‘discerning of spirits’ that is offered as a gift from the Holy Spirit. I lean into 1 Cor 2:10-16.

Will you cast out demons from non-believers and nagging or leeching demons from Christians? That is for you to decide. Luckily, we have the Holy Spirit to help us there. I believe this is something that is influenced by God’s order and gifting. Much like miraculous healing there are several things that come into play such as the faith of the healer, the faith of the crowd, and the faith of the one being healed. You also have to take into account the glory of God, what scripture already says about the situation, God’s will and ways, and a plethora of other influential spiritual dynamics. I believe we should all be open and working on all the gifts. Some see casting out demons as a gift. Some are better than others but (if you follow this theology) all should be working on their gift. So, if you go that way, let me give you a better theological framework for it.

This is sometimes called “Deliverance.” As I am weary as to all of the “encounters” I am convinced possession is real and there is a need to call out the demons in the name of the Lord. As I have mentioned, I respect Andrew Womack’s ministry, and I think He has done some good work in this area. As I am hesitant to share this as I don’t agree with all of it. I think you should read it. 37 It is set up in the form of a group discussion should you want to use it that way. Here is a sermon by Bill Johnson that gets into this, more of a cheerleading piece in my opinion, but you still might find it helpful.

I have cast out more demons than I can count. Here are some things to consider: I believe in counseling and the person may need some through this process. I dislike step plans for anything. God doesn’t always work that way, but here is some framework.

  1. Ask for the spirit to guide you. Seek a fresh anointing and the presence of God. The person needs to be honest and transparent (if they are cognitively able).
  2. What might be holding them back? Bitterness, unforgiveness, communion, unreconciled sin. You might need to bring out what is hidden. What needs to be revealed?
  3. Faith – Your faith, their faith. I believe in counseling and the person may need some.
  4. In the name of Jesus renounce – I have found it the most powerful to shepherd this. Start by saying it and urging the person to affirm in their own words. This means to repudiate; disown; to give up or put aside; to give up by formal declaration; to deny, disavow, discard, recant, cast off, and sever oneself from.
  5. Sometimes I think it is important to make a proclamation to live this out. This comes back to faith. Do they need to break every hereditary curse coming down from their ancestors or through their bloodline? Jesus can break generational chains. I would be careful to call these curses. I don’t think that is always accurate or the best theological framework.

I have grown to very much appreciate Waltons criteria for a faithful interpretation over the years. I really like how he finished one of our conversations and I will share it in hopes that it will also help you come to your own conclusive thoughts. John Walton concludes, “I should make it clear that I have no hesitation at all in my belief that demon possession is a reality and that casting them out is an activity in which Christians may be called upon to engage, though I have never been in that situation myself. Nevertheless, I have questions about how confident we can be in connecting some of the dots (sons of God to demons, demons to evil, Satan to demons) and about some traditional teachings (fallen nature of spiritual beings) that are not taught in the Bible (none are). I hope that my comments will help you sharpen up the post a bit, even when you continue to hold a position that may differ from mine.”38 I love that heart!

I pray that you come to your own well exegeted conclusions. I am going to land with Brian Zahnd39 again on this one (which might point to some of my personal theology here different than where you land.) There is nothing to be done with demons but to wage war upon them and their works. That means setting people free by the Gospel of Jesus Christ and the unique Kingdom manifestation of displacing demons. Every human vice and mental torment is a haunt of demon power. (Some would say this is over spiritualizing things but personally I don’t think so.) We can only imagine what led Mary Magdalene to become vexed by seven demons and how can we imagine the nightmarish road the Gadarene with his thousands of demons walked? But Jesus set them free. And He commissioned His followers to do the same in His name. I have to admit I still have a lot of unanswered questions for Jesus on this one! Don’t live in fear, don’t put the rest of the Bible on the shelf and go on a witch hunt, simply follow Jesus, love people, learn the power of God, and you will have opportunities to set people free from demon power by the authority of Jesus’ name. And finally, remember Revelation 20:10!

Steve Gregg on Demons

4 views for understanding spiritual warfare

  1. Some might consider (1 Sam 16:14) but here it uses the word “oppressed” not “possessed” and it is further not clear whether this should be identified as a demon ↩︎
  2. A personal conversation with John Walton based on his book, https://www.amazon.com/Demons-Spirits-Biblical-Theology-Walton/dp/1498288782 ↩︎
  3. Graf, Fritz (2018). “Travels to the Beyond: A Guide”. In Ekroth, Gunnel; Nilsson, Ingela (eds.). Round Trip to Hades in the Eastern Mediterranean Tradition: Visits to the Underworld from Antiquity to Byzantium. Cultural Interactions in the Mediterranean. Vol. 2. Leiden and Boston: Brill Publishers. pp. 11–36. doi:10.1163/9789004375963_002. ISBN 978-90-04-37596-3. ↩︎
  4. Galambush, Julie (2000). “Eve”. In Freedman, David Noel; Myers, Allen C. (eds.). Eerdmans Dictionary of the Bible. Amsterdam University Press. ISBN 9789053565032. ↩︎
  5. It should be noted that “Fall” is not a Biblical term. It generally refers to a fall (from grace). Walton makes the point that this is not an exegetical conclusion concerning humans, Satan, demons, or the Sons of God. The snake is never connected with Ha-Satan exegetically and he is never the leader of fallen spirits in the Bible. The Bible knows of no fallen beings (except the King of Babylon in Isa 14;12, but that is metaphorical—not a fall from grace and he is not a spirit being). See discussion in W&W. ↩︎
  6. Faulkner, Raymond O.; Goelet, Ogden Jr.; Andrews, Carol A. R. (1994). Dassow, Eva von (ed.). The Egyptian Book of the Dead: the Book of Going Forth by Day. San Francisco, California: Chronicle Books. p. 168. ISBN 978-0-8118-0767-8.  ↩︎
  7. Wilkinson, Richard H. (1992). Reading Egyptian Art: a hieroglyphic guide to ancient Egyptian painting and sculpture (1998 ed.). London, England: Thames and Hudson. p. 161. ISBN 0-500-27751-6.  ↩︎
  8. Belial (or Beliar, a corruption of the original form) is the most common name for the leader of the demons in the Dead Sea Scrolls, and occurs in other intertestamental literature and in II Corinthians 6:15. Belial (Heb. Beliyya’al) is a Hebrew compound word which etymologically means “no benefit” or “no thriving” and in liberal usage is often equivalent to “scoundrel.” But already in the Bible “streams of Beliyya’al” means “streams of destruction” (II Sam. 22:5; Ps. 18:5). In the intertestamental literature Belial is “the spirit of perversion, the angel of darkness, the angel of destruction” and other spirits are subject to him. Mastemah, which as a common noun means approximately “enmity, opposition” in Hosea 9:7, 8 and in some passages in the Five Scrolls, is a demon “Prince Mastemah” in Jubilees (11:5, 11; 17:16; et al.), and perhaps also in the Damascus Document (16:5). Watchers (Aram. ʿirin) are a type of angel mentioned in Daniel 4:10, 14, 20. To this class the intertestamental literature assigns the angels who, according to Genesis 6:2, 4, cohabited with women before the flood and fathered the race of giants (Test. Patr., Reu. 5:6–7; Test. Patr., Napht. 3:5; cf. Genesis Apocryphon, ii 2:1, 16). Asmodeus (Tobit 3:8, 17) is a demon who had slain the first seven husbands of Sarah, who becomes the wife of Tobias son of Tobit. ↩︎
  9. https://www.amazon.com/dp/B0F1FQ5CX8 ↩︎
  10. https://www.amazon.com/Unseen-Realm-Recovering-Supernatural-Worldview/dp/1577995562 ↩︎
  11. van der Toorn, Becking & van der Horst 1999, “Apkallu”, page 72. ↩︎
  12. George, Andrew (2007) “The Gilgameš epic at Ugarit”. Aula Orientalis, 25 (2). pp. 237-254. ↩︎
  13. Ataç, Mehmet-Ali (2010), The mythology of kingship in Neo-Assyrian art (1. publ. ed.), Cambridge University ↩︎
  14. Kramer, Samuel Noah (1961), Sumerian Mythology: A Study of Spiritual and Literary Achievement in the Third Millennium B.C.: Revised Edition, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, ISBN 0-8122-1047-6 ↩︎
  15. https://divinenarratives.org/the-watchers-origins-roles-and-cultural-influence/ ↩︎
  16. Wyatt, Nicolas (2001). Space and Time in the Religious Life of the Near East. A&C Black. ISBN 978-0-567-04942-1. ↩︎
  17. https://www.bing.com/search?q=heiser+%22The+key+to+understanding+how+these+giants+were+perceived+as+demons+in+the+biblical+material&cvid=c4cae408c0fe4b2593efc7b5e97bea16&gs_lcrp=EgRlZGdlKgYIABBFGDkyBggAEEUYOdIBCDQ2NTlqMGo0qAIIsAIB&FORM=ANAB01&PC=SMTS ↩︎
  18. Yogev, J. (2021). The Rephaim: Sons of the Gods. Culture and History of the Ancient Near East. Brill. p. 6. ISBN 978-90-04-46086-7. ↩︎
  19. Rouillard-Bonraisin, Hedwige. 1999. “Rephaim.” In Dictionary of Deities and Demons, pp. 692–700. ↩︎
  20. Kohler, Kaufmann; Ludwig Blau (1906). “Gehenna”. Jewish Encyclopedia. “The place where children were sacrificed to the god Moloch was originally in the ‘valley of the son of Hinnom,’ to the south of Jerusalem (Joshua 15:8, passim; II Kings 23:10; Jeremiah 2:23; 7:31–32; 19:6, 13–14). For this reason the valley was deemed to be accursed, and ‘Gehenna’ therefore soon became a figurative equivalent for ‘hell.'” ↩︎
  21. Barker, Margaret. (2005) [1998]. The Lost Prophet: The Book of Enoch and Its Influence on Christianity. London: SPCK; Sheffield Phoenix Press. ISBN 978-1-905048-18-2 ↩︎
  22. https://hc.edu/news-and-events/2016/12/02/the-role-of-the-ancient-near-east-and-modern-science-in-interpretation/ ↩︎
  23. ANGELS ELECT AND EVIL, C. Fred Dickason, p. 150. ↩︎
  24. IBID 1 ↩︎
  25. https://www.blueletterbible.org/faq/don_stewart/don_stewart_58.cfm ↩︎
  26. https://www.amazon.com/Demons-Bible-Really-Powers-Darkness/dp/1683592891 ↩︎
  27. IBID 1 ↩︎
  28. Demons and Spirits in Biblical Theology: Reading the Biblical Text in its Cultural and Literary Context by John H. Walton and J. Harvey Walton (2019). ↩︎
  29. https://www.deeperwatersapologetics.com/2019/08/19/book-plunge-demons-and-spirits-in-biblical-theology/ ↩︎
  30. IBID 1 ↩︎
  31. https://www.awmi.net/reading/teaching-articles/spiritual_authority/ ↩︎
  32. IBID 1 ↩︎
  33. https://reknew.org/2015/07/are-you-afraid-of-demons/ ↩︎
  34. L. Michael White. “Apocalyptic literature in Judaism and early Christianity”. ↩︎
  35. C. S. Lewis Preface – The Screwtape Letters (1942) ↩︎
  36. https://www.patheos.com/blogs/breathingspace/2023/02/the-difference-between-mental-illness-and-demonic-possession/ ↩︎
  37. https://cdn.awmi.net/documents/study-guides/sg417/discipleship-evangelism-study-guide-language-english-level-2-lesson-5.pdf ↩︎
  38. Personal email from John Walton ↩︎
  39. https://brianzahnd.com/ ↩︎